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Theme: Although for the most part inconclusive, signs of possible Jihadist activity in 
Portugal suggest certain similarities with the risks present throughout Europe. 
 
 
Summary: There are several reasons that justify Portugal’s lack of attention towards the 
Jihadist phenomenon. However, this is not to say that possible Jihadist activity is 
inexistent. In fact, apart from unclear situations that might conceal a Jihadist intent, there 
are a number of public cases where known Jihadists have arrived and spent time in 
Portugal. Still, no evidence of terrorist behaviour was ever discovered. Furthermore, it is 
not clear what the purpose of their permanence in the country was. Still, it is possible to 
detect in the few cases that occurred in Portugal some similarities with the Jihadist reality 




Analysis: France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK are some of the 
European countries that are clearly in Jihadism’s sights. In fact, given the efforts made in 
the EU’s political spheres, Jihadism is addressed as a common strategic threat. However, 
and in spite of historical affinities, geographic proximity and freedom of circulation within 
the Schengen area, Portugal seems to have escaped the violence perpetrated in the 
name of Allah. There is no significant news of Jihadist activities in Portugal, nor does the 
general public perceive it as a threat. But does perception equal reality? 
 
To answer this question, it is important to start by making a brief comment on the reasons 
accounting for the marginal threat perception, namely political discourse, the media and 
the national Muslim community. Secondly, it is also relevant to uncover possible signs that 
might call for alert –in other words, aspects that though not constituting a real threat might 
indicate or evolve into one–. Finally, the analysis of known cases should allow us to obtain 
additional information to grasp this poorly-addressed reality. 
 
A Comment on Threat Perception 
A proper analysis of the reasons behind the absence of a threat perception regarding 
Jihadism in Portugal would certainly require a quantitative and qualitative study. However, 
there are four reasons that would surely emerge as a result of such an analysis: (1) 
Portugal’s attitude towards security and defence issues; (2) media coverage; (3) political 
discourse; and (4) the specific characteristics of the Portuguese Muslim community. 
 
It could be said that contemporary Portugal –as regards both institutions and civil society– 
has a relatively passive, even negligent, attitude towards security and defence issues. 
This somewhat culturally-based stance leads to the adoption of only reactive policies –
instead of preventive policies based on prospective analysis– and is prevalent in many 
aspects of daily life, including the media. 
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Contrary to other European countries, information in open sources related to Islamist 
terrorism in Portugal is practically nonexistent. There are a considerable number of 
academic articles devoted to Jihadist movements in general and to the importance of 
Islam in Portuguese culture, but only a very few regarding Jihadism in Portugal itself. The 
media hardly ever publish any relevant information. Episodes of possible Jihadist activities 
have been reported in the media, although usually in a sporadic fashion and without being 
front-page news. Moreover, such cases have hardly ever brought to light any significant 
information and have never been followed up in any significant way. 
 
A reason that often emerges in political and academic discourse in Portugal to support the 
idea that the country is immune to Jihadism is the country’s low international profile. In 
other words, given Portugal’s lack of leverage in world politics, the impact on the media 
that every terrorist attack aims for would be smaller than if perpetrated in a leading 
European country. Although a partly reasonable explanation, there are four considerations 
that limit its validity: 
 
(1) While this may be true for a well-structured and internationally-connected Jihadist cell, 
it is a mistake to think that the same logic applies to self-starter cells (self-reliant and 
self-recruited groups that have adopted al-Qaeda’s rhetoric but act of their accord).1 
According to Europol, the number of these autonomous terrorist cells is on the rise 
and they are therefore an important concern regarding the Jihadist threat in Europe.2 
(2) The combination of Europe’s freedom of circulation with the efficiency of the 
counterterrorist policies implemented in countries such as Spain, France and 
Germany means that terrorist cells can elect to transfer their activities and, in this 
respect, Portugal could become increasingly attractive as a target. Mounting security 
pressure in several European member states could drive committed terrorist cells to 
search for other countries with less experience in dealing with this sort of threat. Given 
the enormous freedom of circulation that citizens have within the Schengen area, 
transferring terrorist activities from one European country to another is not a difficult 
task. 
(3) Regardless of whether Portugal is –from the Jihadist’s point of view– a good target, it 
is a feasible base for logistic operations –just as Spain was during the 1980s and 90s–
. 
(4) It ignores the fact that the European experience regarding the attraction of Jihadism 
generally relies on offering an identity and a sense of belonging to socially and 
spiritually alienated individuals. Thus, wherever there are socially disenfranchised 
fringes there is a potential radicalisation and recruitment ground. 
 
The last of the four reasons explaining the absence of a perception of threat is the origin 
and structure of the Portuguese Muslim community, which dates from the African 
decolonisation process of the 1970s. The most significant groups came from Mozambique 
and Guinea-Bissau, joining a small group of Muslims already in the country since the 
1950s, who had come as students. Among Portuguese Muslims there are Sunnis, but 
also a notable number of Shiite Ismailias who mainly arrived from Mozambique but are –
for the most part– originally from the former colonial cities of India (Goa, Damão and Diu), 
territories lost by Portugal in 1960. It is also worth mentioning that after the creation of 
Pakistan and India in the 1940s, there was a Muslim exodus from both countries towards 
Mozambique. Hence, despite religious differences, there are no cultural clashes: these 
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Muslims have been part of a Portuguese ‘cultural society’ for decades, identify themselves 
as ‘Portuguese Muslims’ and started integrating decades ago outside the country’s 
contemporary borders. In addition, this community considers Islam an apolitical and 
peaceful religion and has been quite active in promoting inter-faith dialogue. Furthermore, 
most of the members of this traditional community belong to the educated middle and 
upper classes, and despite their exodus from India to Africa and then to Europe, they 
have not faced much hardship in resuming their professional activities, building successful 
careers in the business sector and forging close ties with the Portuguese economic and 
political elites. This well-established and integrated community, with strong Lusophone 
roots which are understood as part of their cultural identity, is largely unaffected by the 
rhetoric of Jihadist recruiters who prey on the socially disenfranchised. However, as 
discussed in the next section, the changes to the country’s Muslim community brought 
about by the migrant influxes of the last couple of decades could very well undermine the 
leverage of Portugal’s traditional Muslim community and decisively change this religious 
group’s identity. 
 
Matters of Interest for Broad Risk Assessment 
It is widely recognised by experts that the forgery of documents and, to a lesser extent, 
drug trafficking are two of the main illegal activities used to support and finance Jihadist 
cells operating in Europe. Such activities have been detected within the new Indo-
Pakistani and Maghrebi immigrant communities residing in Portugal. Moreover, there 
have also been reports of money laundering through small businesses owned and 
managed by members of these communities. Obviously, this does not allow us to 
conclude or even infer anything, but it constitutes a fact that should not be disregarded or 
merely understood as isolated criminal activities. Individuals from the Maghreb comprise 
the bulk of Jihadists arrested in Europe3 while, on the other hand, Muslim migrant 
communities are often used by Jihadist organisations as a means to penetrate western 
societies. These newly-arrived immigrants can counterweigh, or at least bypass, the 
traditional Portuguese Muslim community by creating autonomous cultural-religious 
clusters. In fact, episodes of possible Jihadist activities in Portugal that will be presented 
later on in this analysis seem to confirm the need to draw the security forces’ attention 
towards this new Islamic diaspora. 
 
A further factor to take into account is the presence of Tabligh Jamaat (TJ), an 
international proselytising movement that is often described as being apolitical and 
peaceful, although there is no consensus on this. Founded in 1927 in India by Maulana 
Mohammad Ilyas, it was deeply influenced by Deobandism4 and was a direct response to 
Hindu proselytising. The TJ is one of the world’s most important Islamic movements and 
its annual international event in Raiwind, Pakistan, is the largest Muslim meeting world-
wide after the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, gathering over a million people. While strictly 
focused on propagating the Islamic faith, the TJ preaches an ‘integrist’ and strict version 
of Sunni Islam, similar to the Salafist forms adopted by the Jihadist movements. Though 
not violent in its actions and self-excluded from political participation in the West, the TJ 
prescribes a political version of Islam that perpetuates ‘otherness’, thus possibly 
jeopardising integration and, consequently, social harmony. The movement’s rapid 
                                                 
3 Edwin Bakker (2009), ‘Jihadi Terrorists in Europe and Global Salafi Jihadists’, in Rik Coolsaet (Ed.), Jihadi 
Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2008, p. 75-79; Europol (2009), 
op. cit., p. 18. 
4 An Islamic movement started in 1866 at the Dar al-Uloom Deoband madrassa, north of Delhi, in India. 
Among other features, Deobandis were initially driven by resisting British rule and what they perceived to be 
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penetration in non-Muslim countries began in the 1970s as a result of the joint efforts and 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis and South Asia’s Deobandis.5 Nowadays, 
TJ members travel around the world as missionaries spreading the word of Islam with the 
purpose of establishing networks among Muslim communities in different countries and 
converting non-Muslims. It has successfully fulfilled its goals throughout Europe and the 
US, often functioning in parallel to Wahhabi organisations.6 
 
However, despite its size and world-wide presence, the TJ is largely unknown as its 
activists shun both media and government attention.7 Moreover, the movement has no 
known organisational structure, nor does it advertise its activities and financial records. 
 
This Islamic movement is often accused of being a precursor to terrorist organisations in 
India, Pakistan, Algeria and even Morocco, as well as using its activists’ frequent 
travelling for religious purposes to facilitate logistical and financial support for Jihadist 
organisations. Furthermore, many known terrorists and Jihadist recruiters have at some 
point in their lives belonged to the TJ, suggesting that it is often a preparatory step before 
entering a Jihadist organisation. However, since no indisputable links have ever been 
established, the connection with both Jihadist groups and terrorists could be construed as 
the work of individual members and not of the TJ as a whole. What seems likely is that 
Jihadists take advantage of TJ mobility and meetings to exchange information and carry 
out support activities for terrorist cells. 
 
The TJ has been in Portugal since around 1979, although only in an organised and active 
way since the beginning of the 1980s. The movement holds its annual meeting, the 
Ijtimah, since 1987, an event attended during the past few years mainly by Portuguese 
Muslims although delegations from Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, the UK and many 
other countries have at times been present. The Ijtimah aims to reflect the movement’s 
international dimension and dynamism as well as facilitating contacts between Tabligh 
members from different countries. The TJ is currently using Portugal as a platform for 
spreading its pan-Islamic message to Africa (especially to Portuguese-speaking countries 
like Mozambique) and Latin America (particularly Brazil).8 Within Portugal, the group 
relies on mosques and religious sites on the outskirts of Lisbon (eg, in Palmela, Laranjeiro 
and Odivelas) and on their corresponding madrassas. 
 
Though fairly discrete and committed to projecting an apolitical image, the Portuguese TJ 
branch has not escaped controversy, at least on one occasion. In January 2008 a terrorist 
cell composed of 12 men (11 Pakistanis and an Indian) was dismantled in Barcelona 
before carrying out an attack on the city’s subway system. One of its members admitted to 
the existence of plans for attacks Germany, the UK, France and Portugal. After the 
Spanish authorities issued a terrorist alert for these three countries, the Portuguese 
security agencies started searching for two Pakistani nationals, allegedly members of the 
Barcelona cell that would have entered Portugal through the TJ’s Jamaats (proselytising 
groups) on their way to an Ijtimah. However, neither the Pakistanis’ entry or presence was 
ever confirmed, nor was there any solid evidence pointing to a possible attack in 
                                                 
5 Alex Alexiev (2005), ‘Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions’, Middle East Quarterly, vol. XII, nr 1, Winter, 
p. 4. 
6 Zeyno Baran (2005), ‘Radical Islamist in Central Asia’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 2, p. 51. 
7 Alex Alexiev (2005), op. cit., p. 3. 
8 Member of the Portuguese Intelligence Community nr 1, interviewed by the author, 26/III/2010.  
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Portugal.9 Nonetheless, three of the men detained in Barcelona had attended the Ijtimah 
in the past, between 2004 and 2007.10 
 
There was at least another high-profile participant at a Portuguese Ijtimah. Abdelaziz 
Benyaich, a Moroccan national accused by his country’s authorities of being involved in 
the Casablanca attacks of May 2003, was in Portugal for an Ijtimah when the bombs 
exploded.11 In 2005 Abdelaziz was convicted of belonging to al-Qaeda’s Spanish cell and 
was sentenced to eight years in prison.12 Salahedin Benyaich, alias Abu Muhgen, 
Abdelaziz’s brother, was convicted for the Casablanca attacks and is currently serving 
time in prison in Morocco, and was a mujahedeen in Bosnia, Chechnya and possibly other 
countries. Furthermore, Salahedin was close to Allekema Lamari, one of the terrorists 
responsible for the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Atocha Station, Madrid, who 
committed suicide when surrounded by the police in Leganés, in the suburbs of the 
Spanish capital. 
 
Known Cases of Possible Jihadist Activities in Portugal 
Particularly since 2001, the Portuguese media has echoed some cases of possible 
Islamist terrorist activities in Portugal. The cases presented below were all reported in the 
national media, although here we present new data, analysis and conclusions. 
 
(a) Operation Alfarroba 
In March 2003 a police operation carried out in Lisbon and Quarteira (in southern 
Portugal) lead to the arrest of 13 Algerians suspected of being involved in the forgery of 
documents. The identity of these men was never very clear, nor what their intentions were 
–a lack of information that would become habitual in future cases of possible Jihadist 
activities in Portugal–. Nonetheless, a name emerged from these arrests: Sofiane Laïb, a 
25 year old Algerian national who was in Germany at the time of the arrests in Portugal. 
 
With a record of petty crime –namely small-scale theft and the forgery of documents–, 
Laïb was party to a money transfer carried out by one of the 13 Algerians arrested. It has 
been reported that between 1998 and 2000 Laïb shared an apartment in Hamburg with 
Mohamed Atta, the leader of the cell responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks in the 
US.13 Whatever the case, it has been confirmed that the young Algerian knew Atta and 
frequented the same religious and social circles in Hamburg.14 A few months after the 
arrest of the 13 Algerians in Portugal, Sofiane Laïb was arrested in downtown Lisbon in 
possession of forged documents, the sole crime for which he was convicted. After serving 
a short time in prison, Laïb was expelled to Algiers in April 2006 by the Portuguese 
authorities. One of his known associates was a Tunisian national called Ben Yamin Issak, 
alias Ben Youssef Boudhina, himself close to Atta in German Islamist circles. 
 
In September 2002 Ben Yamin Issak tried to board an airplane in Lisbon headed for 
London. He carried a false French passport which was detected by a steward at the 
boarding gate. The extremely poor quality of the documentation suggests that he was 
                                                 
9 Member of the Portuguese Intelligence Community nr 2, interviewed by the author, 9/IV/2010. 
10 Member of the Portuguese Intelligence Community nr 3, interviewed by the author, 16/IV/2010. 
11 Members of the Portuguese Intelligence Community nrs 1 & 3. 
12 Amanda Figueras (2005), ‘La audiencia nacional condena a 27 años de prisión al líder de la red terrorista 
de Al Qaeda en España’, El Mundo, 27/IX/2005. 
13 José Vegar (2007), ‘O encaixe das rodas dentadas. A investigação do terrorismo Jihadista em Portugal’, 
Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas, nr 54, p. 177. 
14 Members of the Portuguese Intelligence Community nrs 2 & 3. 
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eager to get to the UK. Although detected, Ben Yamin Issak was able to leave the airport 
and later use false Portuguese ID to catch several buses until he arrived in London. 
Sofiane Laïb was waiting in a car outside the airport in case something went wrong –as it 
did– and helped Issak evade capture. When he arrived in the UK, he stayed at Kamel 
Bourgass’s house in Wood Green, north London. Bourgass is an Algerian national who 
trained in Afghanistan and is suspected of having fought for the Algerian GIA (Groupe 
Islamique Armée –Islamic Armed Group–). While in the UK, Ben Yamin Issak and 
Bourgass attended the Finsbury Park mosque, then run by the notorious Imam Abu 
Hamza al-Masri. In January 2003 they managed to anticipate a police raid which found 
Jihadist propaganda, Issak’s false Portuguese ID and castor-oil beans (typically used to 
produce ricin toxin) in Bourgass’s house, thus foiling the well-known ‘London Ricin Plot’. 
Issak’s false ID had been stolen by Sofiane Laïb from an African staying at a hostel in 
Lisbon which is associated with illegal immigration and prostitution. Kamel Bourgass was 
captured a few days later in Manchester after stabbing five police officers with a knife, one 
of whom died. He is currently serving a life sentence and his arrest triggered a raid by the 
British authorities on the Finsbury Park mosque, where false documentation used to 
support Jihadist activities was found. On 12 July 2003 Ben Yamin Issak was arrested in 
Liverpool trying to board an airplane heading for Barcelona. 
 
(b) The Alleged Euro Cup Plot and the Hofstad Group link 
In June 2004, just before the beginning of the Euro Cup –held in Portugal that year–, the 
Portuguese media reported that 11 men of Maghrebi origin had been deported to the 
Netherlands. Despite the fact that the arrest involved more than 20 individuals, only three 
were considered to be of interest,15 among them Nouredine el-Fathmi and Mohammed el-
Morabit, both Moroccan nationals. Nouredine el-Fathmi had lived in Amsterdam with 
Mohamed Bouyeri who, in November of that same year, had assassinated the film 
director Theo van Gogh. 
 
At the time of the arrest in 2004 there was an established link between el-Fathmi and el-
Morabit, who were arrested in a hostel in Oporto, and the Hofstad Group –a well known 
Jihadist organisation in the Netherlands–. 
 
Among other material, the Dutch authorities had previously seized a declaration by 
Nouredine al-Fathmi in which he declared his intention of dying in the name of Allah. 
However, no evidence sufficient to ensure a conviction for terrorist activities was ever 
found in Portugal, and therefore he and the others were deported to the Netherlands 
where they were interrogated by the Dutch authorities and then released due to lack of 
evidence. 
 
There was some speculation about a possible attack on the foreign dignitaries attending 
the Euro Cup, also aimed at the then Portuguese Prime Minister, José Manuel Durão 
Barroso. Although it was a plausible, no actual evidence of a planned terrorist attack was 
ever discovered.16 
 
Given the intelligence gathered by the Dutch authorities, and the surveillance and efforts 
of the Direcção Central de Combate ao Banditismo of the Polícia Judiciária (at present the 
Unidade Nacional de Combate ao Terrorismo, or Counter Terrorism Unit of the Judicial 
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Police), the arrest of these three men seems to have been a relatively over-hasty and ill-
considered decision. 
 
Nouredine el-Fathmi was again arrested in 2005, this time in Amsterdam on his way to 
Lelylaan Station while in the possession of firearms and ammunition. In January 2006 the 
Dutch public prosecutor claimed to have ample evidence that the Hofstad Group was 
indeed a Jihadist organisation, directed by a six-man council to which Mohamed Bouyeri 
and el-Fathmi belonged. In March 2006 el-Fathmi and Mohammed el-Morabit were 
sentenced by a Rotterdam court to five and two years imprisonment respectively. Bouyeri 
was also convicted at the trial for being the ringleader, although he was already serving a 
life sentence for the assassination of Theo van Gogh. Nouredine el-Fathmi was also 
implicated in what the Dutch intelligence called the ‘Piranha Network’, a group plotting to 
assassinate senior Dutch politicians and bomb a government building. 
 
(c) Serguei Malischev and Spain’s Audiencia Nacional 
It has been reported17 that in October 2004 the Spanish authorities warned Portugal of a 
terrorist cell trying to acquire explosives in Bragança, in northern Portugal, with the aim of 
perpetrating an attack against Madrid’s Audiencia Nacional. However, there are members 
of the Portuguese intelligence community who claim there was no such tip-off.18 
 
In May 2005 Portugal deported Serguei Malischev, a man suspected of being involved in 
this plot as well as having strong connections to Jihadist groups. Malischev, a Belarus 
national, remained under arrest in Portugal for two months due to immigration 
irregularities before being deported to Belgium, the country that had issued his Schengen 
visa. During his time in Portugal, as in many other cases, no evidence of terrorist activity 
was discovered. Still, Malischev had an apparently real interest in entering the country 
since he tried to do so twice: the first attempt failed, while the second was successful.19 
 
Serguei Malischev surfaced later in Palma de Mallorca, Spain, were he was accused in 
December 2005 of belonging to a Jihadist cell led by an Iraqi called Abu Sufian, who –
according to police sources quoted in the Spanish media–20 had direct contact with Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. According to Fernando Andreu, the 
Spanish judge who presided over the trials of Malischev, Sufian and others, this terrorist 
cell endorsed proselytising activities and recruited individuals to be later sent to fight in 
Iraq, Chechnya and other countries in Asia. 
 
Malischev was a chemical-weapons expert with a background in Pakistan and Azerbaijan. 
He also went by the names of Andrey Misiura and Amin al Anari and died in prison in 
2009. 
 
(d) The Four Cape-Verdean Dutch 
In February 2006 the Netherlands issued an alert for four Dutch citizens of ethnic Cape-
Verdean descent. The group had been involved in a shootout in a Rotterdam pub causing 
five deaths, after which they fled to Portugal. 
 
                                                 
17 Maria do Céu Pinto (2007), ‘Portugal. Plataforma logística do terrorismo Islâmico’, Cidadania e Defesa, nr 
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18 Members of the Portuguese Intelligence Community nrs 1, 2 & 3. 
19 Member of the Portuguese Intelligence Community nr 3. 
20 ‘La policía detiene a quince personas por reclutar y adoctrinar terroristas para Irak’, El Mundo, 19/XII/2005. 
Area: International Terrorism 








It was said that at least one of them was an Islamist terrorist related to the Hofstad Group, 
and that the gang’s leader had been trained in the Yemen. However, there is no solid 
evidence that either the alleged leader, Fernando Jorge Pires, had been trained in the 
Yemen or that there was any significant link with the Hofstad Group. The shootout in 
Rotterdam was related to a diamond-trafficking deal that had gone wrong, and the alleged 
Hofstad link was no more than contact with a Turkish group that, in turn, had some ties 
with the Dutch terrorist cell.21 Fernando Jorge Pires was arrested on Christmas Eve trying 
to board a plane in Lisbon, while two other members were arrested two months later near 
Amadora, on the outskirts of Lisbon. The fourth man, José Barbosa, was able to escape 
to Cape Verde. 
 
(e) The Last Public Case: Samir Boussaha 
In a European joint operation started by the Italian Carabinieri in Genoa, an Algerian 
national called Samir Boussaha was arrested in Oporto in November 2007. Although it 
was argued in the Portuguese media that he had frequent and firm connections with the 
group arrested in 2004 in Oporto, it seems that the only link was that both Samir and 
those related with the Hofstad Group attended the same mosque –the only one in that 
area of Oporto at the time–.22 
 
According to the Italian public attorney, the 35-year-old Samir Boussaha and his brother 
Mourad were suspected of having been members of the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la 
Prédication et le Combat –Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat–) and of participating 
in a recruiting network that sent fighters to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as of collecting 
funds for Jihadist operations. There was no evidence of Mourad ever having been in 
Portugal and, with respect to Samir, although he was under surveillance for years, no 
hard evidence of terrorist activities was unearthed. The lack of proof from Samir’s 
surveillance is not necessarily due to his innocence, but rather a result of his caution.23 
Nonetheless, when Boussaha was arrested by the Judicial Police, the apartment where 
he lived was also found to contain no evidence. Finally, the barbershop where Samir often 
worked was also above suspicion and the locals who knew him were surprised since they 
saw the Algerian as a kind, polite and sociable person. Samir Boussaha was extradited to 
Italy in mid-November 2007. 
 
Conclusion: Apart from suggesting that the authorities should remain on the alert, the 
cases presented above show that several individuals with disturbing profiles connected 
with Jihadist activities have entered and spent time in Portugal. However, it has been 
impossible to establish either their intentions or their activities –ie, the solid evidence 
needed to guarantee a conviction for terrorism–. The general difficulty in distinguishing 
between insurgents, terrorists and criminals and of obtaining sound evidence to satisfy a 
court of law is a reality in Portugal, as it is throughout Europe. But in the process of fitting 
together the pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of Jihadism in Europe, Portugal is an 
informational black hole. Many explanations can be offered for such an unsatisfactory 
state of affairs: the legal framework under which security agencies operate, the 
shortcoming of the penal code and the lack of preparation and awareness of the country’s 
political decision makers, among others. The complexity and variety of these possible 
explanations requires separate research and analysis. Nonetheless, and with regard to 
this paper’s topic, what is important is that the succession of inconclusive cases –from an 
empirical perspective– reflect structural problems which should be addressed as they 
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could ultimately signal to Jihadist organisations the sort of weaknesses that they might 
decide to exploit for their own benefit. 
 
Despite being nebulous and for the most part inconclusive, these cases of possible 
Jihadist activity in Portugal do suggest some similarities with the situation elsewhere in 
Europe. 
 
Considering what time and research has taught us about Jihadism in the EU, Portugal 
complies with the general picture in the following aspects: most individuals involved in 
suspected Jihadist activities are originally from the Maghreb, the forgery of documents is 
often associated with possible cases of Islamist terrorism, the security forces have found it 
difficult to obtain evidence sufficient to ensure a conviction for the crime of terrorism and 
individuals suspected of engaging in terrorism or parallel activities are often highly mobile. 
 
However, there is another important characteristic of Jihadism in Europe that seems to be 
absent from the Portuguese context. As far as is known, there is no sign of internal 
radicalisation or recruitment or of self-starter cells –even considering the potential perils 
represented by TJ–. Such a difference with the rest of European could have two 
explanations: (1) the degree of integration and sense of identity of Portugal’s traditional 
Muslim community; or (2) the simple fact that home-grown terrorism has not yet been 
detected. However, given the similarities of the phenomenon throughout Europe, nothing 
should be ruled out for the future. 
 
Finally, taking into consideration, on the one hand, the high degree of mobility of the 
suspects involved in the inconclusive episodes detected in Portugal and, on the other, the 
long-established Jihadist activity in Spain, it is puzzling why there has been no spill-over 
effect. The existence of a settled and well-integrated migrant community certainly plays a 
role. Nonetheless, given Spain’s strong commitment to countering terrorism as well as the 
scores of suspects arrested and then convicted by the Spanish authorities, it is curious 
that there is no obvious transit of Islamist terrorists across the Iberian Peninsula. 
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